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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes two simple wage rules that keep employment constant
when there are shocks to the prices of imported materials. One rule ties
nominal wages to the GNP deflator rather than the consumer price index. The
second rule, followed by Japan after the second oil price shock, ties the real
wage to real GNP. The paper shows the effects on output, real income, and
other macroeconomic variables of choosing either rule in place of the real
wage stability provided by conventional wage indexatiori.
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The response of an economy to increases in the prices of imported raw
materials depends critically upon wage behavior, since real shocks of this
kind require adjustment in relative factor prices. If real wages are rigid,
as they are in many European countries, these price increases result in a fall
in employment, together with a reduction in both gross output and domestic
value added. The fall in employment is mitigated if real wages can adjust
downward in some fashion. However, the amount of adjustment required depends
upon the production structure of the economy. Without detailed knowledge of
that structure, an appropriate wage policy is difficult to formulate.
This paper shows that two simple wage rules provide just the right amount
of real wage adjustment to ensure that employment remains constant in the face
of such price shocks. The first rule, which has been advocated in several
different countries, is a wage indexation scheme that ties nominal wages to
the GNP deflator, rather than to the consumer price index.' The second rule
is a little less familiar, but can be shown to be equivalent to the first.
This rule, which was followed by the Japanese trade unions after oil prices
rose In 1979, ties the real wage to the real GNP. Shinkai (1980) attributes
to this rule Japan's recent success in avoiding the macroeconomic stagnation
experienced in other industrial countries.2
The choice between real wage stability on the one hand, and employment
stability on the other, is not an easy one to make. But it is important to
know the issues involved in making a particular choice. This paper analyzes
how gross output, employment, real income, real wages and prices respond under
alternative wage policies. Three wage policies, in fact, are considered.
These are:
1(i) fixing the real wage, i.e., tying the nominal wage to the consumer
price index as is done in many countries with wage indexation;
(ii) adjusting the real wage so as to keep employment constant, and
(iii) adjusting the real wage so as to keep real income constant.
The responses of the key macroeconomic variables to these three policies
follow systematic patterns which simplify the choices among policies
considerably. Real wage resistence has definite costs which can be described
in terms of employment and price behavior. But against these must be weighed
the costs of alternative policies, as the analysis makes clear. Only when
these costs are taken into account can sensible decisions about wage
indexation and employment policy be made.
The setting of this analysis is a small open economy under flexible
exchange rates. The country treats all foreign variables, including the
foreign currency price of raw materials, as given. But the economy produces a
final good which is distinct from the foreign final good, so that changes in
the real exchange rate (between these final outputs) can occur. As a result,
the real price of raw materials varies, depending upon the wage policy
adopted. This provides another dimension which needs to be taken into account
in choosing among the alternative wage policies.
The next section of the paper describes the production technology of the
domestic economy, including the alternative concepts of value added relevant
for the GNP—based wage rules discussed above. Section III then describes the
three wage policies outlined above and shows how the employment stabilizing
rule Is equivalent to the two GNP—based rules. We also compare these policies
with wage behavior in a full information, labor market clearing economy.
Section IV analyzes and compares the impacts of the three policies in a world
where domestic and foreign final goods are perfect substitutes so that the law
2of one price for these goods prevails. Section V analyzes the general model
and shows that the results of the simpler case continue to hold even when
changes in the relative prices of final goods (the real exchange rate)
occur. The main conclusions are reviewed in a final section.
II. DOMESTIC PRODUCTION BEHAVIOR
The key aspect of the model is the domestic production sector and
accordingly this is described in some detail. In doing so, it is important to
distinguish between the different concepts of value added and to define
precisely what we mean by the value added deflator.
Gross output, Z of the domestic final good is assumed to take a
separable form Z =F[f(L, Nt]where Lt represents labor, represents
capital, and Nt denotes imported raw materials. The quantity V =f(L,1)
is defined to be domestic value added, measured in terms of inputs.3 For
simplicity, value added is assumed to be a Cobb—Douglas function of labor and
capital, while gross final output is a CES function of value added and
imported materials
(1) Vt =Ln)K
(2) Z =[N;+ (1 —
Althoughit is reasonable to assume a Cobb—Douglas production function for
domestic value added, existing estimates for the elasticity of substitution
between Nt and V, denoted by a =1/(1+ p), are typically much lower than
unity, and hence production of gross output is more appropriately described by
a CES function. Throughout our discussion we shall restrict a to be less than
or equal to one (a1). While this is plausible for the situation we wish to
analyze, it is of course theoretically possible for a > 1, in which case some
of the implications we draw would require appropriate modification.4
3It is convenient to conduct our analysis using linearized approximations
for these production functions with all variables expressed as percentage
changes about an initial equilibrium (denoted by the subscript 0). Let lower
case letters denote the percentage change in the corresponding level variable,
so, for example, z (Z —Z0)/Z0.
Then for small changes (1) and (2) may be
approximated by
(1') v =(1—
(2') z =c1n+ c2V
where c1 =(Z0/N0)' c2 =(1—
andhence 0 < c1 < 1, 0 < c2 < 1, c +c2
=1
In deriving (1') from (1) we assume that the time period being considered is
sufficiently short so that capital remains fixed, i.e., kt =0.Note that
(1') and (2') can also be derived as log—linear approximations for (1) and
(2).




where denotes the price of gross output, W denotes the nominal wage rate,
and P is the domestic price of imported raw materials. Given the
separability of the production process, this optimization can be broken down
to the following pair of decisions:
Ci) Choose Lt to maximize: —
WtLt
(ii) Choose Vt and Nttomaximize: P[8NP + (1 —)v]'
—PNt
—PVt
4where in subproblems (i) and (ii) p denotes the value—added deflator, to be
defined below.
Linearizing the corresponding marginal productivity conditions for these
two problems yields the following expressions for £,n,and v in terms of






— __,_v - = Z — —
AsArrow (1974) has shown, the value added price index is defined
implicitly by the dual to the CES productionfunction (2), namely
1+p
= +(1 —
In deriving (4) use is made of the facts, obtained from the marginal
productivity conditions, that
PnN Pvv
c =(ZIN)P =OOc =(1-)(Z/v )P=
00 00
so that c1 and c2 represent the shares of imported materials and value added,








Thepriceof final output is thus a weighted average of the prices of raw
materials and value added, the weights being their respective shares in final
5output. This implies that the value added deflator is a weighted average of
the price of final output and of imported inputs, with the weight on the
former being greater than unity and the weight on the latter being negative;
i.e., an "external average" in Arrow's (1974, PP. 15—16) terminology. Note
also that equation (5) can be obtained directly by substituting the optimality
conditions (3b) and (3c) into the production function (2') and using the fact
that c1 + c2 =1.
En addition to the value added concept already defined in (1) and (1'),
there is a second measure of value added that is important in the discussion
below; that measure is expressed in terms of the final good rather than in
terms of the physical inputs. It is defined below both in natural units (6)








measures the real income accruing to the domestic factors of production,
capital and labor,6 in contrast to Vt which measures the real net output of
these factors. (We later define a second measure of real income defined in
terms of a consumer price index).
Using (2') and (5), we can show that the two measures of value added are





Thusthe two measures will be different to the extent that the relative prices
6of final output and value added, or the relative prices of final output and
imported materials, diverge.
To complete our description of the production sector we solve equations
(1'), (2'), (3a), (3b), (3c) for the real variables: employment, £,value
added measured in terms of inputs, v, and in units of the final good, v,
final output, z, and imported materials, •Weexpress each of these
variables in terms of the two relative prices that are important in the
discussion below; these are the real wage facing the producer (w — and
,fl -- r.t_ - LLL LdI. UI. LL1 .LmpuL-LeuULdLCE.LdI.S nt"
£[Iresuicingexpressions
are
Vt 1 Clfl (9a) (1 —)
= = — — (w—
1))
—
(1—a) C1 (9b)v =
— (w
— — p)









Fromthese expressions it is evident that all quantities are inversely related
to each real price.
III. ALTERNATIVE WAGE POLICIES
It is evident from the expressions (9a)—(9d) that the response of the
economy to a change in the real materials price depends crucially upon the
adjustment of real wages. We now introduce the three alternative wage
policies we wish to analyze.
71.Stabilizing the Real Wage
This policy is the familiar one of setting the nominal wage so as to keep
constant the real wage, defined in terms of labor's consumption basket.
Formally, this is described by an indexation rule,
(10) w_P=O,
where p= cSp. + (1 —ô)(p+ er), 0 < 5 < 1, is the consumer price index
(CPI), Pt =foreignprice of the foreign final good, et =exchangerate
(expressed as the domestic price of foreign currency), and tS is the share of
the domestic good in the domestic consumption basket. As in Section II all
variables are expressed in terms of percentage changes. Defining the relative
price of foreign to domestic goods, which we also call the real exchange rate,
by f
St =Pt+ e —Pt
the domestic CPI can be written as
(11) =+(1 —
Thusa wage policy of stabilizing the real consumer wage is equivalent to
adjusting the real producer wage to the relative price in accordance with
(10') w —= (1—
2. Stabilizing Employment
As already noted earlier, since the capital stock is fixed in the short
run, (the percentage change in) value added v is proportional to (the
percentage change in) employment. Accordingly, stabilizing employment is
equivalent to stabilizing this form of value added. From equation (9a) it is
seen that this policy involves setting the real producer wage w —Pt
in
8accordance with the rule
(12)
That is, in response to a one percent increase in the real domestic price of
imported materials, the real producer wage must be reduced by (c1/c2)
percent.7 From Section II c1/c is the ratio of the values of imported raw
materials to domestic value added. This ratio almost certainly is
substantially smaller than unity, in which case the required downward
adjustment in the real producer wage is substantially less than proportional.
We show now that the rule described by (12) is equivalent to the two wage
rules outlined in the introduction, namely: (i) tying the nominal wage to the
value added deflator, p; (ii) tying some measure of the real wage to some
measure of real GNP. We consider these rules in turn.
First, equation (12) Immediately implies
c +c c
1 2 in =
c2Pt c2t
and noting c1 + c2 =1together with (5) yields
= — (c1/c2)p=
therebydemonstrating case (i). The reason why this rule stabilizes
employment is seen immediately from the production function (1') and the
optimality condition (3a). What it does is to fix the real wage relevant for
the employment decision, namely the nominal wage deflated by the value added
deflator.
The second rule is a little more difficult to interpret, since there are
several definitions of both value added and the real wage. We consider two
natural variants. The first is to tie the real producer wage to value added
9measured in units of final output (which is one measure of real income); i.e.,
(13) w p=v
The second is to tie the nominal wage deflated by the value added deflator to
value added in physical units, Vt,
V (13) w_p=v
Thetwo expressions are equivalent as can be seen by substituting (7) into
(13).
Rules in either of these forms will stabilize employment and value







— = — ! (w—pV)
According to these expressions, either real wage rule (13 or 13') keeps the
nominal wage equal to the value added deflator. But we have already shown
that tying w to p keeps employment and value added constant because it
stabilizes the real wage relevant for employment decisions. Hence either real
wage rule can be used to stabilize employment and value added.
It is useful to compare the first two wage rules with wage behavior in a
full information, frictionless economy. Gray (1976) has argued that if labor
contract lags are the sole reason for departures from pareto optimality, a
wage rule should be chosen which most closely resembles wage behavior in a
frictionless economy without contract lags. To determine wage behavior in
such an economy, we need to extend the previous model by including a labor
10supply function. This is specified to be
(14) =n(w
—p), n > 0,
reflecting the fact that labor supply is a function of the real consumer wage.
In a frictionless economy, labor market equilibrium is assumed to hold.
Thus equating labor demand, specified by (9a), with labor supply, specified by
(14), we find that the equilibrium solution for the real producer wage is
na(i c1/c2 (15) W—p
I.. LLLLL I..j1UL L-t
Recalling(10') and (12), we may express (15) in the form
(16) (w —tf
= (w
— + na (w
—t2
where the subscripts 1, 2, and f denote the real wages under policies 1, 2,
and full information, respectively. It is immediately seen from (16) that the
real wage in a frictionless economy is a weighted average of those under
policies 1 and 2, and therefore in general lies in between them. The weights
depend upon (1) the elasticity of labor supply, n, and (ii) the elasticity of
output with respect to capital, a. In the limiting case when the supply of
labor is infinitely elastic, n +, thefrictionless rule converges to policy
1. At the other extreme, the frictionless real wage coincides with policy 2,
namely tying the nominal wage to the value added deflator, when the supply of
labor becomes totally inelastic (n =0).Jewi1l not explicitly analyze the
effects of this intermediate wage rule on output and other macroeconomic
variables, but it should be obvious that the effects of this rule will lie
between those of policies 1 and 2.
ii3. Stabilizing Real Income
Policies 1 and 2 represent polar extremes of quantity and price
adjustments in the labor market. In both cases, as will become apparent
below, real income is reduced if the price of materials rises in real terms.
Given the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function for Vt (which keeps
the shares of wage income and profit income constant), a reduction in total
income also implies a proportionate reduction in both components of income.
As a third policy we consider one in which the nominal wage is adjusted so as
to keep real income and its components constant. By real income we mean value




By combining (11) and (9b) we can show that for real income to remain
constant, the real producer wage must be adjusted In accordance with the rule
—C
1 n a(1 6) (18) w ( Pt) (1 —) S
That is, the real producer wage must fall in response to either a rise in the
real price of Imported materials or a rise in the real exchange rate. The
required reduction In the real wage in response to a rise in the price of
imported materials, by c1/1.c2(1 —cL)),is greater than that required by the
second wage policy of stabilizing employment (see (12) above). The extra fall
in the real wage raises labor income relative to the second wage policy
because the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the real producer wage
exceeds unity (implying that employment rises more than proportionately as the
12real wage falls). This tradeoff between real wages and real income is
discussed further below.
In this third wage rule, s is an endogenous variable dependent upon
demand as well as supply behavior. In all three wage rules, moreover, the
real domestic price of imported materials, p —p,is an endogenous variable
since it depends upon s. To show this, we express p' —Ptin terms of s as
well as the real foreign price of imported materials,
—
PtSt + Ot
f f f where = —qbeing the nominal price of imported materials in
foreign currency.
With the wage rules depending upon endogenous prices, we cannot generally
assess the effects of the rules until we have specified demand behavior as
well as supply behavior. In section IV we focus on the limiting case where
domestic and foreign final goods are perfect substitutes so that the law of
one price keeps the price of domestic output at its purchasing power parity
(PPP) value. In this case the real exchange rate is constant, or s =0.The
real price of imported materials, moreover, is equal to the exogenous real
foreign price. As a result the analysis of each wage rule is considerably
simplified.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE WAGE POLICIES UNDER PPP
The main reason for beginning with this case is that it helps to clarify
the general case to follow. Most of the effects we wish to consider can be
obtained simply by a consideration of the production sector alone and carry
over virtually unchanged to the general case where domestic and foreign final
goods are imperfect substitutes. We shall focus on the effects of an
exogenous increase in the real price of raw materials under the three
13alternative wage rules, on:




(v) the domestic nominal price level (exchange rate).
These results are summarized in Table 1.
-
1. Stabilizing the Real Wage
If the real wage is stabilized, an increase in the real price of imported
materials leads to a fall In employment, as well as a fall in real income and
final output. The effects of the increase in this price can be traced
throughout the production sector. First, the higher price of imported
materials reduces the use of materials, as well as gross output, though to the
extent that materials and value added are substitutable in production (as
reflected in a), the fall in the latter is smaller. Secondly, the policy of
fixing labor's real wage also fixes the real producer wage if PPP holds. With
the latter real wage fixed, employment must fall. With capital fixed in the
short run, value added (vt) must also fall as well. Thirdly, real labor
income must fall since real wages are fixed and employment falls. Moreover,
the fact that value added is produced by a Cobb—Douglas production function
means that the share of labor income in total income remains constant. Thus
the fall in real labor income implies a corresponding reduction in real
income, t•
Toconsider the effects on the domestic price 'level, which under the
assumption of PPP is equivalent to the nominal exchange rate, requires the
introduction of the domestic money market. In general this is assumed to be




-12r 1 > 0, 12 > 0
(20) r =+e+1 —e
where =domesticmoney supply, measured as a percentage change;
e+1 =expectationof et for period t+1, formed at time t;
r =domesticnominal interest rate;
=foreignnominal interest rate;
and all other variables are as defined previously. Equation (19) is just the
usual money market equilibrium condition, where the demand formoney depends
positively upon real income (defined in terms of cost of living units) and
negatively upon the domestic nominal interest rate. The assumption that
domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes is expressed by the
uncovered interest parity condition (20).
We now invoke the additional assumption that the foreign price shock is
unanticipated and is expected to be transitory; that is, is just a purely
stochastic disturbance. This assumption simplifies the solution of the model
when expectations are formed rationally, since in this case the expected
exchange rate is just equal to a stationary value (which we assume to be zero,
i.e., e+1 =0.)If we substitute (20) into (19) and invoke the PPP
assumption, we find
1fl(1 + 2t =11v
—Y2r
Assuming mt and remain fixed, we obtain
(19') —1dv
0
dO (1 + 12) °t
ArtIncrease in the foreign materials price lowers real Income, and therefore
the demand for money. In order for the domestic money market to remain in
15equilibrium, the real money stock must fall. Given the nominal money stock
the domestic price level Pt must rise; i.e., the nominal exchange rate must
depreciate.
2.Stabilizing Employment
Suppose now that the wage rate is set so as to stabilize employment. In
this case an increase in the materials price leads to a fall in the real wage
accompanied by an equivalent fall in real income and a fall in final output.
The impact effect of such an increase in is to reduce the use of materials,
thereby reducing the employment of labor and gross output, as for polIcy 1.
In order to restore the employment of labor, the wage rate is reduced in
accordance with (12). Given the complementarity of the two factors of
production, the additional labor tends to increase the use of materials,
thereby partially but not fully offsetting the initial fall in demand for
materials, so that on balance final output falls. The fact that the real wage
falls means that real labor income and hence total income falls, doing so by
an amount which in general is in excess of the fall in gross output. The
effect on the nominal price level is virtually the same as in policy 1 and the
same reasoning applies.
3. Stabilizing Real Income
Real labor income is by definition equal to÷w
— Bothof the
above policies lead to a reduction in this quantity. If the real wage is
stabilized, the reduction occurs via a reduction in employment; if employment
is fixed, the reduction is through a lower real wage. Either way, the real
income of labor is reduced. Indeed, as we have noted before, given the Cobb—
Douglas production function, total real profit and total real income, t' are
reduced similarly. Thus as a third policy we consider one where wages are
adjusted so as to maintain total real income (as well as real wage income)
16fixed. In this case we see from Table 1 that the real wage falls, while
employment and gross output rise.
To consider this policy, suppose that initially there is no adjustment in
the real wage. An increase in the materials price thus leads to a fall in the
demand for materials, leading to a reduction in employment, gross output, and
real income. Now suppose that y (or equivalently, £ + w —p)
is
stabilized by adjusting the real wage in accordance with the rule specified in






The induced effect on employment stemming from this real wage cut exceeds the
reduction directly due to the higher materials price, and hence on balance
employment rises. Real labor income is maintained constant because employment
rises enough to offset the lower real wage. The effect on final output is
proportional to (1 —a),implying that final output rises if a1 as we
assume.
The effect on the price level is obtained from the money market






Stabilizingreal income leaves the demand for real money balances unchanged,
so the price level is also stabilized.
4.Comparison of Effects
The expressions summarized in Table 1 indicate a strong ordering in
effects as we move through the three policies 1 —3.Real wages are
stabilized under policy 1 but decline under either alternative policy; the
decline is largest when real income is stabilized. Even policy 3 does not
17require a fall in the real wage as large (in absolute percentage terms) as the
rise in the real price of materials as long as c11(c2(i —)) <1, i.e., as
long as the ratio of the value of materials to labor is less than one.
A similar ranking applies for employment. The negative and positive
employment effects which correspond to stabilizing the real wage and real
income, respectively, are bracketed about the zero effect when employment is
stabilized. The ranking for real income is reversed from that for real
wages. The adverse effects on real income are reduced as we move from the
policy of stabilizing wages through stabilizing employment to stabilizing real
income. These same algebraic orderings are obtained for final output, the
only difference being that in policy 3, final output actually rises.
Finally, the same ordering as obtained for real wages applies to the
nomiaal price level. Stabilizing the real wage has the greatest positive
effect on the price level exceeding that when employment is stabilized; when
income is stabilized, the price level remains constant.
Overall, these results indicate a range of tradeoffs associated with
different wage policies. If the objective of wage policy is to stabilize the
real wage, then employment and real income must fall; if the objective is to
stabilize employment, then the real wage and real income must fall. So
policies 1 and 2 provide a clear choice between real wage stability and
employment stability. Wage behavior in a frictionless economy without
contract lags, often used as a standard for judging wage policies, would lie
somewhere between these two extremes. If the objective of wage policy is to
stabilize real income or to stabilize prices, on the other hand, policy 2
dominates policy 1, since both real income and prices vary more under a real
wage stabilization policy. Policy 3, moreover, dominates both alternative
18policies since under that policy real income and the price level are
completely stabilized.
V. ALTERNATIVE WAGE POLICIES IN THE GENERAL CASE
We now relax the assumption of PPP maintained in Section IV and allow the
domestic and foreign goods to be distinct. This means that the relative
price, s, becomes an endogenous variable. To determine it, we need to extend
the model to include a demand side. In equation (21), the real demand for the
domestic product is expressed as a function of real income, both deflated by
the general price index, as well as the real interest rate and relative
prices.8
(21) z + Pt —p
=d1[v+ p —
1* I
d2[r — —Pr)]+ d3s
where 0 < d1 < 1, d2 > 0, d3 > 0. We assume that d1 has a value between zero
and one so that an increase in real income leads to a less than proportionate
increase in real demand.
Because aggregate demand is a function of the real interest rate,
r — — p),the behavior of the real part of the system depends upon
future expectations, which in turn depend upon the nature of the materials
price increases impinging on the economy. We assume that these disturbances
are both unanticipated and temporary. Under these conditions, it can be
established that the rational expectations solutions for expectations of the





19The aggregate demand equation can be simplified further by substituting in
equation (21) the following equation for v obtained by solving (3b) and (6'):
ci
(22) v = — — (1c)(s+
C2 t
The result is the first of two equations describing how gross output and the
relative price are jointly determined. The second equation, reproducing (9c),
describes aggregate supply of the final good.
I I r i c1(1 -
1















reflects the total effect of an increase in the relative price, s, on
aggregate demand, including the indirect effect of s on real income. We
assume that the total effect of a rise in s is to raise aggregate demand, so
d5 > 0. In obtaining the aggregate demand equation, wehave assumed for
convenience that the foreign interest rate and the price of the foreign good
(in foreign currency) are constant (= 0and p =0).The increase in the
real price of materials, thus is due to an increase in the nominal price,
f
The two equations of (23) express output and 'relative prices as a
function of the real price of materials, and the real producer wage. The
real wage, in turn, depends upon which of the three wage policies are
followed. We express these policies, given by (10'), (12), and (18) above, in
20terms of s and as follows:
labor's real (24a) w —p=(1— t t t wage constant
(24b) w Pt =— _!(s + , employmentconstant




By substituting one of these expressions into (23), we obtain solutions for Zt
and s. These are reported in Table 2 together with the real price of
materials, s + 0' as well as three other variables previously analyzed in
the case of PPP:(i) labor's real wage, (ii) employment, and (iii) real
income. The latter expressions are obtained by substituting w —sand
into the following equations:
(25a)w —= (w— — (1—






Equation(25a) follows directly from the definitions of p and s; equation
(25b) reproduces (9a); while equation (25c) is obtained by solving (9b) and
(17).
We begin with these last three variables which are described in the first
three rows of Table 2. As is evident from this table, the qualitative
effects of an increase in the real price of materials follow the same patterns
as in the much simpler PPP case discussed in Section IV. In order to
stabilize employment in policy 2, real wages must fall but real income falls
less than in policy 1.In order to stabilize real income in policy 3, real
wages must fall even more, but employment now rises. The reasoning is
21basically unchanged from before. Similarly, in the fourth row we see that
final output falls most when real wages are fixed and actually rises when real
income is fixed.
Underlying these changes in production variables are changes in relative
prices which are of interest in themselves. For policies 1 and 2, an increase
in the real price of materials has an ambiguous effect on the relative price
of final goods, s, while for policy 3 the effect is positive if a < 1. The
indeterminacy in the case of policy 1, for example, arises because the
increase in the price of materials reduces both aggregate supply and aggregate
demand (through its impact on real income). As the expressions in (23)
indicate, an increase in reduces both demand and supply with the net effect
on s, which can be viewed as the equilibrating price in the output market,
depending upon which effect dominates. Similar reasoning applies for policy
2. In the case of policy 3, however, the fall in the real wage is large
enough to offset the increase in so that aggregate supply function
increases, causing Zt and s to rise unambiguously.
Despite the ambiguities regarding the direction of movement of s, we can
establish that s always acreases the most (in algebraic value) for policy 3
and increases the least (or decreases the most) for policy 1. This provides
the key to understanding the adjustment of the real price of materials
measured in domestic units, —
Pt
=+ Forall three wage policies
St +rises,as one would expect. The more labor's real wage is allowed to
adjust downwards (i.e., as we move from policy 1 through to policy 3),
moreover, the greater is the positive effect of this foreign shock on the
domestic real materials price. So by stabilizing employment, and even more so
by stabilizing real income, we turn the price of materials measured in
domestic units against the domestic economy. The reason is that s rises more
22as we move from policy 1 to policy 2 and finally to policy 3, SOSt + must
also rise more. This is one cost to be borne if we follow a policy of
stabilizing employment or stabilizing real income.
Finally, we may note that the effects of the increase in the materials
price on the domestic price level can be derived from the money market
equilibrium condition, equation (19), as it was under PPP. The effects mirror
those obtained for the relative price, s. We do not know whether p rises -or
falls for policies 1 and 2, but can establish that p definitely falls for
policy 3. Moreover, we can derIve the following rankIng,
I I I
dp dp dp
1 dO 2 dO
where the subscript denotes the policy. Thus the price level always rises the
most (or falls the least) under policy 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
Increases in the prices 'of imported materials confront policy—makers with
a difficult set of choices involving real wages, employment, and real
income. If real wages remain fixed in response to such price increases,
whether because wages are indexed to the consumer price index or because they
are linked to prices in negotiated settlements, costs are imposed on the
economy. These costs include reductions in employment, GNP, and real
income. Flexibility in the real wage, by contrast, may enable employment, and
even real income, to remain constant in the face of such external shocks.
Real wage flexibility is difficult to achieve in practice.'° This paper
has shown, however, that two indexation rules provide just the right degree of
wage flexibility to stabilize employment. One rule is to tie nominal wages to
23a value added deflator rather than the consumer price index, as is
traditionally done. The other rule, which we have shown to be equivalent to
the first, is to tie real wages to real GNP. Just how these rules would work
out in practice is suggested by the recent macroeconomic performance of Japan
which, after the second oil shock of 1979, kept its real wages in line with
real GNP. We have also shown how real income, as well as real labor income,
can be stabilized by further reductions in the real wage large enough to raise
employment. No country has pursued this more extreme policy, but the pattern
of results in this case reveals further the nature of the tradeoff between
real wages and employment.
24FOOTNOTES
Countries where such proposals have been debated includeDenmark, Israel
and the United Kingdom. See, for example, the study ofwage indexation by
Braun (1976). Recently the Congressional Budget Office (1981) has compared a
variety of indexation rules for the United States including tying wages and
federal benefits to the GNP deflator specifically to exclude the impact of
import prices. Marston (1982) examines the effects of wage indexation to the
price of the domestic (final) good, but imported materials are not included in
that analysis.
2Shinkai (1980,p. 19) quotes a union 'white paper': "[Ojur wage demand
is based on our assessment of the impact of [the] oil price rise and growth
prospect, and aims at a real wage increase lower than the real GNP
growth .. ."
mustbe separable in Nt and Vt in order for V to be well defined.
(See Arrow, 1974, p. 4). There is some debate about whether a production
function separable in Nt and V is appropriate for oil and other forms of
energy (as opposed to raw materials). Berndt and Wood (1979), for example,
propose an alternative production function where oil combines with
capital to fçrm a composite separable from labor (and other raw materials),
z =ZLL,Z1(K ,0)j.Johnson (1981) analyzes the effects of an oil price
increase in such a model.
4The combination of a CES function forgross output and a Cobb—Douglas
function for value added was previously employed by Bruno and Sachs (1979) and
Bruno (1981). Note that in their simulation model, Bruno and Sachs choose an
elasticity of substitution between Nt and Vt equal to 0.2. (Bruno and Sachs,
1979, p. 36).
5Equations (1') and (2') are the first order terms of a Taylor series
expansion around the initial equilibrium. If a log—linear approximation is
instead used, with the lower case letters denoting logarithmic differences,
then (1') holds exactly while (2') is a first—order approximation.
is sometimes called a single—deflated measure of value added since it
is obtained by deflating nominal value added by the price of the final good.
See Bruno (1981, p. 4).
7Bruno (1981,p. 7) derives a similar condition for keeping employment
constant in response to an Increase in raw materials prices. He points out
that with employment stabilized, the marginal product of capital (and hence
its rental) must fall by the same proportion as the marginal product of labor.
8Note that like the other equations In the model, (18) is inpercentage
changes. Thus d1 and d3 represent elasticities, while d2 is a semi—
elasticity.
9The determinantsD1 and D2 are both necessarily positive if d5 > 0, as
assumed. We assume that the aggregate demand coefficients, d2 and d3, are
large enough so that D3 > 0.
25'°If nominal wage rigidities inhibit the required adjustment of real
wages, it may be possible to achieve the necessary adjustment in the real wage
through the introduction of appropriate taxation on wages. We are grateful to
Joshua Aizenman for this point.
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